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contemporary	 welfare	 state	 in	 the	 UK.	 Drawing	 on	 themes	 in	 Karl	 Polanyi’s	 The	 Great	
Transformation,	the	article	identifies	the	nature	of	the	constitutive	role	of	contemporary	social	
policy	and	 law	 in	 the	creation	and	maintenance	of	markets	and	opportunities	 for	 the	private	
sector	 in	 the	 field	of	welfare.	By	 reference	 to	 recent	 legislative	 reforms	and	developments	 in	
health	 care	 and	 unemployment	 policy,	 the	 article	 focuses	 on	 the	 institutional	mechanisms	 –	
especially	forms	of	law	and	social	relations	–	being	put	in	place	to	foster	a	friendly	environment	




openings	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 within	 welfare.	 In	 Polanyi’s	 terms,	 the	 result	 is	 that	 the	








society	now	play	an	 important	role	 in	processes	of	disembedding	–	a	state	of	affairs	 that	has	
potentially	detrimental	consequences	for	those	seeking	assistance	from	the	welfare	state.	
Introduction	
Social	policy	and	related	 legislation	present	an	opportunity	 to	consider	 fundamental	 issues	of	
law,	economy	and	 society	 and,	 importantly,	 the	 interplay	between	 them.	As	 such,	 they	 form	
fertile	subjects	for	engaging	with	an	economic	sociology	of	law.	In	recent	years,	however,	there	
has	been	a	tendency	in	some	academic	literature	to	treat	them	as	if	they	were	distinct	entities.	













The	 welfare	 state	 illustrates	 this	 vividly.	 Thus,	 through	 discharging	 its	 core	 function	 of	














workers.	What	 can	 be	witnessed	 today,	 however,	 is	 a	more	 direct	 role	 for	 social	 policy	 and	
related	 legislation	 in	 supporting	 capital	 –	 something	 that	 has	 implications	 for	 assumptions	
surrounding	the	traditional	functions	of	the	welfare	state.	Via	a	focus	on	recent	developments	
and	 reforms	 within	 health	 care	 and	 unemployment	 policy	 and	 law,	 the	 article	 develops	 an	
analysis	 of	 the	 types	 of	 institutional	 mechanisms	 that	 are	 being	 deployed	 to	 facilitate	 the	
implementation	of	this	more	direct	role	of	social	policy	and	law.	
In	order	to	frame	the	discussion	and	analysis,	the	article	draws	on	some	themes	and	concepts	
from	 a	work	 that	 has	 to	 a	 degree	 inspired	 the	 development	 of	 economic	 sociology	 and	 the	




the	 embeddedness	 of	 the	market	 economy	 in	 society	 and	 social	 relations;	 the	 second	 is	 the	
stress	 he	 places	 on	 state	 intervention	 as	 an	 indispensable	 element	 in	 the	 construction	 of	
markets.	Those	features	of	his	work	provide	a	conceptual	framework	through	which	to	reflect	
on	 the	 important	 changes	 in	 the	 roles	 of	 current	 social	 policy	 and	 law.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	
allows	 for	 a	 focus	on	 their	 constitutive	 functions	 in	 respect	of	markets	 and	opportunities	 for	
profit	 making	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 within	 the	 field	 of	 welfare.	 Specifically,	 it	 directs	 us	 to	
consider	the	types	of	institutional	mechanisms	–	including	the	forms	of	law	and	social	relations	
–	that	have,	and	are	being,	created	for	the	purpose	of	facilitating	such	objectives.	On	the	other	







risks	 flowing	 from	capitalism.	As	we	will	 see,	 in	 some	circumstances	 today’s	 social	policy	and	
law	 are	 being	 deployed	 in	 ways	 that	 create	 conditions	 for	 precisely	 the	 production	 of	 such	
consequences	and	risks.	
The	reciprocal	relationship	between	social	and	economic	policy	









Famously,	Polanyi	goes	on	to	 illustrate	 this	scenario	by	reference	to	 the	dangers	arising	 from	
the	 fictitious	 commodification	 of	 land,	 labour	 and	 money	 that	 emerged	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	


















was	not	 some	 sort	 of	 free-floating	 entity	 that	 emerged	out	of	 thin	 air	 and	operated	without	








charts	 the	 development	 from	 the	 1870s	 of	 strong	 Trades	 Unions	 that	 negotiate	 wages	 and	
conditions	 of	 labour	 outside	 of	 the	 self-regulating	market.	Moreover,	 such	measures	 had	 as	
their	 objective	 non-monetary	 interests	 such	 as	 ‘professional	 status,	 safety	 and	 security,	 the	
form	of	a	man’s	life,	the	breadth	of	his	existence,	the	stability	of	his	environment’.10	It	was	the	
need	 for	 social	 protection	 to	 address	 the	 ‘social	 interests	 of	 different	 cross	 sections	 of	 the	
population	[…]	threatened	by	the	market’	that	mattered.11	According	to	Polanyi,	such	measures	

























from	 the	1870s	onwards	had	 to	 serve	non-economic	 interests	 (‘the	 form	of	 a	man’s	 life,	 the	
breadth	of	his	existence’	etc.).	That	is,	they	had	to	ensure	that	markets	and	the	economy	were	
rooted	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	 society	 and	 reflected	 the	 non-economic	 interests	 and	 values	
associated	with	man’s	life.	
Published	 in	 1944,	 Polanyi’s	 book	 appeared	 just	 before	 the	 establishment	 in	 the	 UK	 of	 the	
institutions	of	societal	self-protection	that	have	come	to	be	known	collectively	as	the	welfare	
state.	 Before	 assessing	 whether	 and	 how	 some	 recent	 examples	 of	 social	 policy	 and	 law	 sit	




In	 The	 Future	 of	 the	 Capitalist	 State,14	 Jessop	 develops	 an	 ideal	 typical	 analysis	 of	 what	 he	
identifies	as	the	two	dominant	 forms	of	capitalist	state	 in	the	post-WWII	era	–	the	Keynesian	
Welfare	 National	 State	 (KWNS)	 and	 the	 Schumpeterian	 Competition	 State	 or	 Schumpeterian	








purposes.	 First,	 Jessop	 stresses	what	 he	 calls	 “the	 regulation	 approach”	 to	 capitalism,	which	
posits	that	stable	capital	accumulation	is	unlikely	to	result	from	the	operation	of	market	forces	
alone.	 Rather,	 it	 requires	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	 state	 and	 other	 ‘non-market	mechanisms’.	
These	‘shap[e]	the	dynamic	of	accumulation	as	well	as	being	shaped	by	that	dynamic.’15	In	other	
words,	 accumulation	 (economic)	 regimes	 and	 political	 regimes	 co-evolve.	Moreover,	 ‘choices	





state.	 Let	 us	 now	 look	 briefly	 at	 this	 second	 aspect	 of	 his	 work	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 two	
features	of	social	policy	that	will	form	the	focus	of	the	reflections	in	the	remainder	of	the	paper.	
Jessop	 first	 discusses	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘the	 social	 reproduction	 of	 labour-power	 as	 a	 fictitious	
commodity’.	 In	 the	 era	 of	 the	 KWNS,	 the	 state,	 rather	 than	 families	 and/or	 liberal	 market	
forces,	becomes	the	key	player	 in	this	reproduction.	Here,	the	socialisation	of	 life	risks	occurs	
via	a	system	of	comprehensive	and	(near-)universal	measures	designed	to	redistribute	wealth	
to	 those	 in	 need.	 Access	 to	 these	 measures	 was	 based	 mainly	 on	 ‘past,	 present	 or	 future	
participation	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 and/or	 on	 national	 citizenship.’17	 In	 contrast,	 within	 the	














be	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 economically	 competitive.	 The	 welfare	 state	 was	 therefore	
redesigned	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 costs	 and	 to	 help	 facilitate	 and	 enhance	 the	 establishment	 of	
flexible	 labour	 markets.	 One	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 this	 occurred	 was	 (and	 is)	
workfare	 –	 a	 social	 policy	 that	makes	 the	 receipt	 of	 state	unemployment	benefit	 conditional	
upon	signing,	and	complying	with,	a	contract	stipulating	a	variety	of	work-related	activities	to	
be	undertaken	with	a	view	to	returning	 the	unemployed	to	 the	 labour	market.	Those	 ‘active’	
labour	policies	differ	 from	the	KWNS’s	 ‘passive’	system	of	unemployment	support,	where	the	




















provision	 of	 social	 services,	 which	 may	 involve,	 for	 instance,	 outright	 privatisation	 or	 such	
provision	 by	 those	 sectors	 combined	 with	 public	 payment,	 or	 the	 application	 of	 market	
discourse	 and	 practices	 within	 a	 publicly	 funded	 and	 provided	 service	 (such	 as	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 internal	market	 within	 the	 UK’s	 National	 Health	 Service	 (NHS)	 in	 the	
1990s);	and,	2)	greater	reliance	on	public-private	partnerships	as	a	mode	of	governance	within	
the	welfare	sector.	In	other	words,	the	function	of	social	policy	is	no	longer	simply	to	ensure	the	
public	 financing	 of	 publicly	 delivered	 social	 services.	 The	 prising	 open	 of	 this	 monopoly	 to	
include	the	involvement	of	the	private	sector	means	that	social	policy	 is,	at	 least	 in	part,	now	
specifically	designed	to	facilitate	opportunities	for	profit	making.	
Jessop’s	 work	 on	 the	 reciprocal	 relationship	 between	 economic	 and	 social	 policy	 since	 the	
1940s	presents	two	key	issues	that	might	fruitfully	be	refracted	through	the	prism	of	Polanyi’s	
work,	outlined	earlier.	First,	there	is	a	suggestion	that	social	policy	and	the	institution	created	
for	 the	 purpose	 of	 society’s	 self-protection	 against	 the	 detrimental	 social	 consequences	
produced	by	capitalism	–	the	welfare	state	–	have	been	redesigned	in	order,	predominantly,	to	
support	 the	 very	 source	of	 those	 consequences	–	 that	 is,	 capitalism.	This	 is	 at	odds	with	 the	
impact	of	the	forms	of	social	protection	that	Polanyi	charted	from	the	1870s	onwards	as	these,	
he	argued,	ensured	that	the	economic	system	became	re-embedded	in	the	social	–	that	is,	that	











facilitator	 of	 markets	 and	 opportunities	 for	 profit	 making	 represents	 a	 disembedding	 of	 the	
economy	from	social	relations,	resulting	in	‘the	running	of	society	as	an	adjunct	to	the	market’.	
Moreover,	we	encounter	here	a	reversal	of	Polanyi’s	double	movement	thesis,	in	which	forms	
of	 social	 protection	 are	 created	 in	 order	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 deleterious	 effects	 of	 markets;	





policy	 today,	 then	 a	 second	 issue	 arises.	 This	 involves	 identifying	what	 kinds	of	mechanisms,	
including	legal	ones,	are	used	for	this	purpose,	and	what	forms	of	social	relations	are	expressed	
through	 those	 mechanisms.	 Here,	 we	 are	 less	 concerned	 with	 Polanyi’s	 concept	 of	
embeddedness	and	more	with	his	observation,	reiterated	by	Jessop,	that	state	 intervention	is	
crucial	 in	 establishing	 and	 maintaining	 markets	 and	 possibilities	 for	 capital	 accumulation.	 In	
particular,	 it	 is	 the	 political	 formulation	 and	 deployment	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 institutions	 and	
institutional	 mechanisms,	 and	 through	 these,	 the	 construction	 and	 use	 of	 specific	 forms	 of	











social	 policy	 and	 law	 in	 establishing	 and	 maintaining	 markets	 and	 opportunities	 for	 profit	
making	within	the	welfare	sector.	
Constituting	 Markets	 and	 Profit	 Making	 Opportunities	 –	 Health	 Care	 and	
Workfare	
(i)		 Solidarity	and	Reforming	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	
The	 first	 mechanism	 that	 is	 increasingly	 deployed	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 establishing	 and	



















that	 points	 to	 the	 use	 of	 this	monetary	 fund	 and	 certain	 types	 of	 law	 to	 create	 and	 sustain	
markets	 and	opportunities	 for	profit	making	within	 the	 field	of	welfare.	 The	 result	 is	 a	novel	
form	of	redistribution	–	that	is,	from	the	public	to	the	private	sector	–	which,	as	we	shall	see,	




Some	 recent	 developments	 in	 the	 NHS	 serve	 to	 illustrate	 those	 arguments.	 One	 is	 the	
prominent	role	of	public-private	partnerships	(PPPs;	formerly	the	Private	Finance	Initiative)	as	



















Care	Act	2012	 replaces	Primary	Care	Trusts	with	 clinical	 commissioning	 groups	 (CCGs)	 as	 the	
bodies	responsible	for	commissioning	(purchasing)	most	health	care	services	within	the	NHS	(a	
task	 that	 will	 involve	 responsibility	 for	 spending	 £80bn	 of	 NHS	 resources).	 By	 2016,	 it	 will	
become	 possible	 for	 CCGs	 to	 outsource	 their	 commissioning	 work	 to	 non-public	 bodies	 –	
including	private	firms.	A	market	will	therefore	effectively	be	created	for	such	services	and	be	




























creating	a	 level	playing	 field	 in	which	private	providers	of	health	care	can	compete	to	deliver	
NHS	healthcare	services.	CCGs	will	need,	 in	effect,	 to	ensure	that	a	 tendering	process	 for	 the	
provision	of	NHS	services	is	in	place,	if	they	are	not	to	fall	foul	of	competition	law.	
Those	developments	and	reforms	do	not	mean	that	redistribution	in	the	original	sense	of	that	




the	 NHS	 and	 capital.	 For	 instance,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 since	 its	 inception	 the	 NHS	 has	
maintained	in	good	condition	what	Marx	referred	to	as	‘a	disposable	industrial	reserve	army’.29	
But	 the	 NHS	 was	 not	 originally	 designed	 to	 be	 a	 source	 of	 capital	 accumulation	 and	 profit	
making	in	itself	–	that	is,	as	an	institution	the	private	sector	became	directly	involved	in	running	














The	 shift	 entails	 a	political	 reformulation	of	 the	ends	 to	which	public	 resources	 are	directed.	
This	manifests	itself	in	the	public	fund	being	made	to	adopt	another	redistributive	dimension	–	
namely,	to	act	as	a	direct	source	for	the	extraction	of	private	wealth.	It	also	has	implications	for	
the	 idea	 of	 the	 socialisation	 of	 risk	 that	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 solidarity,	 as	 its	
meaning	is	no	longer	confined	to	describing	the	community’s	pooling	of	resources	to	the	end	of	
protecting	 its	 members	 against	 the	 risk	 of	 social	 misfortune	 (such	 as	 illness);	 rather,	 as,	 for	
example,	 PPPs	 demonstrate,	 it	 also	 incorporates	 the	 deployment	 of	 this	 common	 fund	 to	
protect	those	in	the	private	sector	from	a	variety	of	economic	risks.	As	Pollock	et	al	note	of	PFI	
(now	PPP)	 contracts,	 they	 rarely	 transfer	economic	 risks	 to	 the	 funding	 consortium,	with	 the	
result	that	these	usually	fall	on	the	public	and	its	purse.	For	instance:	‘Where	a	Trust	wishes	to	
terminate	 a	 contract,	 either	 because	 of	 poor	 performance	 or	 insolvency	 of	 the	 private	




meaning	 too	 in	 that	making	 available	 the	welfare	 state’s	 public	 funds	 for	 the	 private	 sector	
opens	up	an	invaluable	source	of	income	and	potential	market	and	profit	making	opportunities	
at	 times,	 such	 as	 the	 present,	 of	 sluggish	 economic	 growth	 at	 the	macro	 level.	 Importantly,	
though,	 this	 shift	 in	 the	 function	 of	 the	 socialisation	 of	 risk	 has	 the	 concomitant	 effect	 of	












debts	 or	 costs	 or	 harms	 of	 others	 outside	 of	 the	 group	 too.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 foregoing	
examples,	this	means	that,	via	the	medium	of	contract,	taxpayers	become	jointly	and	severally	
liable	 for	 repaying	 the	 significant	 costs	 of	 PPP	building	projects,	 including	 costs	 flowing	 from	
any	default	on	the	part	of	the	private	funding	consortium.	In	turn,	and	perversely,	citizens	also	
become	 liable	 for	 the	 social	 costs	 they	 themselves	 suffer	 (lack	 of	 access	 to	 adequate	 health	
care,	 say)	 as	 these	 flow	 from	 the	 liability	 to	 pay	 the	 financial	 costs	 of	 PPPs	 from	 public	

















































The	 workfare	 contract	 –	 or	 ‘claimant	 commitment’,	 as	 it	 is	 now	 known	 after	 the	
implementation	of	the	Welfare	Reform	Act	2012	(WRA	2012)	–	is	the	social	policy	mechanism	
used	by	the	state	to	support	flexible	 labour	markets.	The	choice	of	contract	 is	 important	as	 it	






reciprocity	 in	 the	construction	of	 the	agreement.	 In	other	words,	 it	envisages	 formal	equality	
between	the	contracting	parties.	This	 is	 important	as	it	means	that,	by	being	deemed	to	have	
voluntarily	 chosen	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 contract,	welfare	 recipients	 can	 be	 taken	 to	 have	 freely	
negotiated	and	accepted	the	responsibilities	under	the	agreement.	In	other	words,	they	can	be	


















those	 contractual	 norms	 are	 replicated	 in	 practice,	 they	 are	 treated	 as	 if	 they	 are.	 It	 is	 the	
ideological	dimension	of	the	workfare	contract	–	that	is,	its	ability	to	represent	unemployment	
and	the	solutions	to	it	as	revolving	around	a	formally	equal	set	of	social	relations	characterised	
by	matters	of	 individual	choice	and	responsibility	–	that	 is	 important	here.	Possible	structural	
causes	of	unemployment,	 such	as	 flexible	 labour	markets	 themselves,	 are	obscured,	allowing	
politicians	to	claim	these	markets	as	solutions	to	the	problem,	rather	than	as	the	problem	itself.	




and	number	of	 contractual	breaches,	 the	 classification	of	 claimant,	 and	 the	 type	of	workfare	
programme.	While	 the	 presence	 of	 those	 sanctions	 may	 confirm	 the	 critique	 that	 workfare	
contracts	are	not	based	on	the	norm	of	consent	(for	the	inevitable	reduction	in	or	removal	of	
one’s	 unemployment	 benefit	 in	 the	 event	 of	 non-compliance	 effectively	 leaves	 the	 claimant	
with	no	practical	alternative	but	to	agree	to	the	conditions),	again	it	is	the	ideological	aspect	of	
contract	 –	 that	 you	 must	 suffer	 the	 consequences	 of	 breaches	 of	 your	 voluntarily	 assumed	
obligations	–	that	is	crucial	in	lending	legitimacy	to	a	policy	designed	to	entrench	flexible	labour	









taxpayer	 of	 unnecessary	 costs	 also	 serves	 to	 further	 contemporary	 social	 policy’s	 aim	 of	
securing	the	presence	of	flexible	labour	markets	and,	hence,	a	more	competitive	economy.	
It	could	be	argued	that	other	mechanisms,	such	as	the	Mandatory	Work	Activity	scheme,	have	
been	 developed	 with	 the	 same	 objective	 of	 maintaining	 flexible	 labour	 markets	 in	 mind.	







mechanisms	demonstrate	however,	 is	 the	 crucial	 constitutive	 role	 the	 state	plays	 through	 its	
social	policy	in	developing	and	maintaining	flexible	labour	markets.	In	that	sense	they	bear	out	
Polanyi’s	observation	 that	 the	 state’s	 intervention	 is	 crucial	 in	establishing	and	maintaining	a	
market	economy.	
Workfare	also	contains	elements	pointing	 to	a	Polanyian	disembedding	of	 the	economy	 from	
society;	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 policy	 is	 not	 necessarily	 designed	 to	 protect	 society	 and	 its	
members	from	the	deleterious	human	consequences	of	the	operation	of	markets.	On	the	one	
hand,	 this	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 provision	 for	 the	 removal	 of	 benefits	 from	 those	 failing	 to	
discharge	their	contractual	workfare	obligations.	On	the	other	hand,	by	binding	beneficiaries	to	











precarious	 forms	 of	 employment	 and,	 eventually,	 back	 on	 benefits	 –	 the	 so-called	 revolving	
door	syndrome.37	Consequently,	workfare	is	very	different	to	the	types	of	protective	measures	
Polanyi	described	as	emerging	 from	the	1870s.	 Importantly,	 it	would	not	appear	 to	serve	the	
types	of	non-economic	interest	–	‘safety	and	security,	the	form	of	a	man’s	life,	the	breadth	of	
his	 existence,	 the	 stability	 of	 his	 environment’	 –	 Polanyi	 viewed	 as	 a	 condition	 of	









Revealingly,	 the	 possibility	 of	 disaffiliation	 in	 the	 present	 context	 arises	 through	 the	
intervention	of	the	welfare	state	and	its	objective	of	supporting	flexible	labour	markets.	It	is	a	
social	 cost	 written	 into	 the	 state’s	 social	 policy	 –	 a	 form	 of	 policy	 originally	 designed	 to	
ameliorate	the	worst	social	and	economic	consequences	of	capitalism.	 In	Polanyi’s	terms,	not	
only	 is	 this	an	example	of	 ‘the	running	of	society	as	an	adjunct	to	the	market’;	 it	also	reveals	
that	 the	 institutions	most	 traditionally	associated	with	embeddedness	have	today	themselves	
become	important	vehicles	of	disembeddedness.	
The	 next,	 and	 final,	 section	 draws	 together	 the	 paper’s	 themes	 by	 reflecting	 upon	 what	











Historically,	what	were	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	welfare	 state	 upon	 law?	Having	
identified	formal	rational	 law	as	the	form	of	 law	characteristic	of	Western	modernity	and	the	
rise	of	the	capitalist	economy,	Weber	notes	the	challenges	being	made	to	the	formal	qualities	
of	 modern	 law.	 With	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 ‘modern	 class	 problem’,	 there	 arose	 ‘[n]ew	
demands	 for	 a	 “social	 law”	 to	 be	 based	 upon	 such	 emotionally	 colored	 ethical	 postulates	 as	
“justice”	 or	 “human	 dignity”,	 and	 directed	 against	 the	 very	 dominance	 of	 a	 mere	 business	
morality’.39	This	 results	 in	what	Weber	calls	 the	materialisation	of	 formal	 law,	as	 law’s	 formal	
and	 abstract	 system	 of	 general	 rules	 becomes,	 inter	 alia,	 more	 particularistic	 (designed	 to	
further	specific	economic	or	social	purposes	within	commercial	or	labour	law,	for	instance)	and	
involved	 in	 the	management	 of	 class	 conflict.	 This	 dilutes	 its	 formal,	 impartial	 and	 technical	
character	as	its	function	shifts	from	ensuring	the	equality	of	legal	subjects	before	the	law	to	the	
implementation	of	particular	governmental	social	policies	designed	to	redress	the	inequalities	
arising	 from	 capitalism.	 In	 other	 words,	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 the	 form	 and	
function	of	law	alter	from	those	characteristic	of	the	liberal	state.40	
How	 might	 the	 legislation	 considered	 in	 this	 paper	 fit	 within	 this	 historical	 trajectory	 from	
formal	 rational	 law	 to	 social	 law?	The	 first	point	 to	note	 is	 that	 it	displays	elements	of	 social	





	Weber’s	 identification	of	 the	materialisation	of	 law	has	given	rise	 to	a	sizeable	 literature	on	this	 topic,	 largely	
taken	 up	 via	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 juridification.	 See,	 for	 instance,	 J.	 Habermas,	 The	 Theory	 of	
Communicative	 Action	 –	 Volume	 2:	 Lifeworld	 and	 System	 (1987),	 356-73;	 G.	 Teubner,	 ‘Juridification:	 Concepts,	
Aspects,	 Limits,	 Solutions’	 in	 Juridification	 of	 Social	 Spheres:	 A	 Comparative	 Analysis	 in	 the	 Areas	 of	 Labor,	
Corporate,	Antitrust	and	Social	Welfare	Law,	ed.	G.	Teubner	(1987),	3-48;	and,	F.	Ewald,	‘A	Concept	of	Social	Law’	







instance,	 in	principle	 at	 least,	 access	 to	NHS	 services	 continues	 to	be	based	on	 clinical	 need,	
rather	than	the	ability	to	pay.	
But	 this	 Act	 and	 the	Welfare	 Reform	 Act	 2012	 also	 contain	 evidence	 of	 elements	 of	 formal	
rational	 law	 and	 an	 image	 of	 social	 relations	 influenced	 by	 the	 liberal	 political	 rationality	
associated	with	this	form	of	law.	Thus,	the	possibility	of	applying	competition	law	to	ensure	the	







allocation	 of	 social	 burdens	 and	 profits’.41	 Similarly,	 the	 workfare	 contract	 and	 claimant	
commitment,	while	not	strictly	legal	entities,	are	founded	on	the	same	idea	of	social	relations	–	










relations	 and	 the	 formal	 properties	 of	 contract	 law	 means	 that	 those	 types	 of	 social	
consequences	have	no	bearing	on	the	legal	validity	of	workfare	mechanisms.	
Those	Acts	therefore	display	elements	of	both	social	law	and	formal	rational	law.	Importantly,	
the	 latter	 functions	 as	 a	 central	 institutional	 mechanism	 through	 which	 the	 welfare	 state	
establishes,	 supports	 and	 maintains	 markets	 today	 (flexible	 labour	 markets	 in	 the	 case	 of	
workfare	 and	 a	market	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 services	 and	 infrastructure	 in	 the	 field	 of	 health	
care).	Within	the	sphere	of	social	policy,	formal	rational	 law	and	its	associated	liberal	form	of	
social	relations	are	therefore	constitutive	of	the	development	of	markets	and	opportunities	for	
capital	 accumulation	 and	 profit	 making.	 Those	 functions	 demonstrate	 one	 of	 Polanyi’s	 key	
arguments,	namely	that	state	 intervention	 is	crucial	 to	the	establishment	and	continuation	of	
free	 markets.	 Laissez-faire	 did	 not	 require	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 state	 in	 order	 to	 flourish;	
instead,	 it	demanded	constant	state	policing	and	assistance.	Law,	of	course,	had,	and	has,	an	
integral	 role	 to	play	 in	 this.	Contract	and	property	 law,	 for	example,	are	essential	not	only	 in	
providing,	 via	 principles	 such	 as	 freedom	 of	 contract,	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 private	 property	
rights	 within	 an	 already	 existing	 market;	 they	 are	 foundational	 in	 establishing	 markets.	 As	
Paddy	Ireland	notes:	




















as	 self-determining,	 self-interested	 actors	 who	 voluntarily	 create	 their	 responsibilities	 via	
consensual	 agreements.	 Given	 that,	 politically,	 it	 would	 be	 unfeasible	 simply	 to	 dismantle	
welfare	 institutions	 and	 move	 to	 a	 system	 of	 private	 insurance,	 the	 desire	 to	 use	 these	




).	While	 this	 includes	 implementing	what	 for	 the	 post-WWII	
welfare	 state	 are	 new	 legal	 mechanisms	 and	 political	 rationalities	 (albeit	 they	 have	 a	 much	
older	provenance),	it	also	involves	putting	what	might	be	called	the	existing	system	of	public	or	
social	wealth	at	 the	service	of	markets,	capital	accumulation,	and	profit	making.	The	result	 is	
that	 the	 solidarity	 fund	 takes	 on	 an	 additional	 redistributive	 function	 –	 redistributing	wealth	
away	 from	 those	 for	 whom	 it	 was	 originally	 intended	 and	 towards	 those	 who	 operate	 the	
system	 –	 the	 capitalist	 economy	 –	 responsible	 for	 producing	 the	 need	 for	 a	 welfare	 state	









This	 raises	 a	 final	 point,	which	 is	 that	 the	 form	of	 law	 increasingly	 to	 be	 found	within	 social	









only	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ‘needs’	 which	 are	 so	 compelling	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 ignored	 by	 the	
collectivity.’44	 But	 as	 welfare	 policy	 itself	 is	 increasingly	 tailored	 towards	 private	 ends,	 it	 too	
becomes	 ‘divested	 of	 the	 person’,	 as	 the	 approach	 to	 unemployment	 benefit	 via	 workfare	
demonstrates.	 Unlike	 the	 protective	 legislation	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 that	
Polanyi	discusses,	the	 legislation	described	 in	this	paper	 is	not	exclusively	concerned	with	the	
protection	 of	 non-economic	 interests,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 one	 might	 consider	 welfare	 as	
indispensable	to	what	Polanyi	describes	as	‘the	substance	of	society’.	For	welfare	–	‘the	state	of	









conditions	 for	human	beings	not	simply	 to	exist,	but	 to	 flourish	 (of	 ‘doing	well’).	Health	care,	
education,	decent	work,	and	shelter	are	all	preconditions	for	the	realisation	of	this	flourishing.	
The	 rise	 of	 formal	 rational	 law	within	 the	welfare	 sector	 operates	 as	 part	 of	 an	 institutional	
framework	responsible	 for	the	steady	erosion	of	such	an	understanding	of,	and	aspiration	to,	
welfare,	and	its	replacement	with	one	in	which	Weber’s	‘business	morality’	begins	to	dominate.	
